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Speculations on Infrastructure: from colonial public works to a postcolonial global asset 
class on the Indian Railways 1840-2017.  
 




This article issues a challenge to examine the current emergence of infrastructure as a global 
asset class against a longer term colonial history of speculation. Taking the case of the Indian 
railways it shows that their current financialization and transformation into a logistical 
network emerges from colonial techniques of calculations of risky frontiers, state guarantees 
and debt accounting.  Historical forms built from racial and national inequalities have been 
incorporated into a new era of the financialization of public works led globally by the World 
Bank. This new moment erases the distinctive political histories of public works, while also 
capitalising on these. Overall this leads to two theoretical claims, first that we should only use 
the term ‘infrastructure’ self-consciously as a mode of critique of such contemporary moves. 
Secondly that our theories derived from Marx, Foucault and Callon place too much emphasis 
on ‘economisation’ and that we need to replace this with attention to speculation. Speculation 
is affective, intellectual and physical labour that aims to direct capital towards various ends. It 
involves the ethical imagination of social differences and places distinctions of race, nation 
and gender at the core of calculative regimes. This labour is governed by key nodal contracts 
between the market and the state and associated accounting and legal regimes or treaties for 
accumulation.  






Since the 1990s a crisis in the financing of infrastructure has been declared by national 
governments and international organisations. Like most declarations of crises this has 
generated political and financial experiments in intervention (Roitman, 2013). Since 2014 
these initiatives have become more urgent due to the challenge of China’s One Belt One 
Road Initiative. In India these longer term debates have led to recent developments in the 
state railways. In 2016 Suresh Prabhu, the BJP minister, used his annual railway budget 
speech to announce an expansion of lines and increasing of PPPs (Ministry of Railways 
2016). Global and national private capital would be deployed to create logistics planning, 
freight corridors and high speed trains to serve international markets. The financial forms that 
support this project cement ties to Europe, America, Russia and Japan as a counterpoint to 
China’s growing influence. These are funds such as the Indian Railway Finance Corporation 
(IRFC) and the National Infrastructure Investment Fund (NIIF) backed by government 
guarantees that issue rupee denominated debt bonds into the London, Singapore and Bombay 
stock exchanges. As well as allowing private extraction from the Indian railways these are 
invested in by political organisations such as the British government, JICA, the Asian 
Development Bank and Russian quasi-governmental corporations. Both the IRFC and the 
NIIF are now circulating as successful models for overcoming a global ‘infrastructure deficit’ 
in World Bank and IMF reports. In this article I demonstrate the importance of situating these 
current initiatives in a longue durée analysis. In India these experiments directly capitalize on 
the legacies of colonial relations—representations of India as a risky frontier for capital; 
techniques of state guarantee; and debt accounting. More broadly many current experiments 
in infrastructure finance capitalize on the past, present and future of large-scale circulatory 
networks, which were once public works.  
3 
 
A longue durée analysis is particularly important because debates and polices since the 1990s 
erase the history of public works in order to financialise circulatory networks. This erasure is 
achieved by the creation of a universal global thing called ‘infrastructure.’ This is then treated 
as a single asset class that has no specific history or material form. An asset class is a group 
of financial instruments that have the same essential qualities because they ‘behave similarly’ 
in financial markets. Infrastructure is assumed to have a shared quality of long-term financial 
returns based on a statistically diversified series of material forms and lack of sensitivity to 
inflation pressures. In this article I disrupt this discursive erasure of history and materiality by 
focussing on the longue durée of a single circulatory network--the Indian Railways. At a 
theoretical level by connecting colonial history to contemporary financial accumulation I 
demonstrate that we need to revise our approaches to financial practices and to infrastructure. 
As I will explain next at the core of my intervention is a critical deployment of the concepts 
of speculation, infrastructure and timescapes of circulation. 
 
On Speculation, Infrastructure and Timescapes of Circulation 
Turning first to speculation, this concept moves beyond the split between theories centred on 
technical calculations in financial markets and those focussed on the ethics of capitalist 
practices. During the past eighteen years, Callon’s approach to market devices has stimulated 
research across the social sciences. This performativity school emphasizes the power of 
practices of calculation held together by technical networks (Callon, 2006; Beunza & Stark, 
2012; Kjellberg & Hegelson, 2007; Muniesa, Millo & Callon, 2007). Another approach 
influenced by Foucault examines how ethical practices and human agency create the ‘spirit of 
capitalism’ (Appadurai, 2011; Miller and Rose, 2008; Rudickyi, 2010; Zelizer, 2010). More 
recent work has started to construct a middle ground between these positions by 
deconstructing the determining power of technical devices and models. It shows that 
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calculative devices become entangled with popular ethics (Weszkalnys, 2011; Dunn, 2005) 
and moral attitudes of belief and doubt (Maurer, 2002; Miyazaki, 2007; Zaloom, 2004). It 
demonstrates that models are affected by the cultures of policy institutions and arise from 
their practices (Farias, 2014; Svetlova, 2012). It is clear it is no longer useful to have separate 
theories to explain, on the one hand the technical and, on the other, the ethical practices that 
are both part of capitalist action on the world.  
The decade since the 2008 financial crisis has increased scepticism about these 
separate streams of theory. There has been a rejection of the “hagiography” of expert 
knowledge implicit in a focus on calculative practices and performativity (Bryan et al, 2012). 
Importantly financial markets have been shown to involve ignorance, clashing knowledge 
systems and narratives (Beckert, 2013; Leins, 2018; McGoey and Davies 2012; Tuckett and 
Chong, 2014). The crisis has also shaken the agnostic approach to accumulation that has been 
characteristic of work in the vein of Callon and Foucault (Pryke & Du Gay, 2007). My article 
constructively theorises this intermediate position between Callon, Foucault and Marx by a 
turn to the analysis of speculation. 
Why, then, is speculation such a useful concept? Speculation overcomes the 
dichotomies between calculative and ethical approaches and between attention to financial 
market techniques and their social effects. Speculation, is future-oriented social action that 
uses technologies of imagination to generate accumulation. From it emerges a durable 
arrangement of extraction. This is held together by mediating institutions such as financial 
markets, management consultancies, accountancy firms, government institutions, nodal legal 
contracts and media spectacles. Through these mediations there is an attempt to coordinate 
and draw attention to speculation. Speculation is a form of affective, discursive and physical 
labour that evokes and then resolves the uncertainty and instability of value (Bear, Birla, & 
Puri, 2015). This labour uses practices of valuation and evaluation in order to: anticipate, 
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stimulate and control the future. In some ways speculation is akin to divination as described 
in the anthropological literature. Like divination it invokes an invisible ethical realm and 
makes it visible in order to explain the past, present and future and to generate agency 
(Sneath et al, 2009; Da Col & Humphrey, 2012; Graeber, 2012; Nielsen, 2014). In fact it rests 
on a dynamic play between visibility and invisibility. This play creates a superabundance of 
meaning through the use of symbolism (Tedlock, 2006; Werbner, 1973). Most importantly 
speculation creates truth-events by bringing “relevant meaning trajectories together” 
apparently “by coincidence” (Holbraad, 2012). Calculative devices are part of speculation, 
but importantly they do not, as Callon assumes, act like Austin’s performative utterances that 
found worlds (Butler, 2010; Callon, 2010).  
My alternative focus starts with a different claim--that economics and economic 
action emerge from speculation on ethical orders and life-processes. This speculation aims to 
accumulate from human and non-human vitality. This future-oriented action reproduces 
relations of circulation, labour and social reproduction. Most importantly it is a prospecting 
that is oriented by concepts of race, nation and the social at its core (Bear et al, 2015; Ho, 
Rofel, & Yanagisaiko, 2019; Tsing, 2015, Yanagisaiko, 2002). Through a focus on 
speculation, therefore, we can rewrite our accounts of capitalism from a post-colonial 
position. As I will show this becomes particularly clear by tracing the history of financing 
forms for the Indian railways.  
Turning next to infrastructure how am I deploying this term critically? It is striking 
that during the same period that infrastructure has become a key global problematic it has 
also become a focus across the social sciences. In anthropology important research has 
explored the forms of political life that emerge in relation to it (Anand, 2017; Barnes, 2014; 
Bear, 2007; 2016; Bjorkman, 2015; Carse, 2014; Collier, 2011; Fisch, 2013; Hetherington & 
Campbell, 2014; Knox, & Harvey, 2015; Larkin, 2015; Pia 2017; Von Schnitzer, 2016). 
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Within geography, ANT and STS approaches make visible the nonhuman material ground for 
human sociality (Barry, 2013; Simone, 2004). Yet there has been little consideration of how 
the problematic of infrastructure has become so widespread across our field-sites nor of what 
kinds of accumulation it is associated with. Instead infrastructure has been treated as a neutral 
theoretical term. Rather than taking it for granted, I will trace the genealogy of infrastructure 
to the attempts by the World Bank (WB) since the 1990s to privatise public works and turn 
them into a global asset class.  
Importantly both speculation and infrastructures exist in relation to timescapes of 
capital circulation. Marx addressed these issues in Capital Volumes II and III in which he 
analysed the UK Railway Mania of 1842-7 and the railway share collapse leading to the 
Overend Gurney bust of 1869 (de Paula, et al, 2012). On the basis of these events, Marx 
argued that fixed capital was a key site of contradiction in the circuit of capital that produces 
ever-increasing crises. This was because fixed capital in the instruments of production and 
transport worked on a different rhythm in time from the circuit of commodities (Capital: 
Volume II). First it draws capital out of circulation and slows down the realisation of surplus 
value. Secondly once this fixed capital becomes a physical form it is in a similar position to 
that of the labourer. Surplus value is extracted from it with no process for the return of capital 
for its full reproduction. Marx argued that these contradictions were temporarily fixed by the 
redeployment of the social (and non-human) product of profit being reissued in bills of 
exchange and coupons. Yet this ‘solution’ Marx argued inevitably results in further issuances 
of financial contracts in chaotic speculation. This ultimately creates an expropriation and 
centralisation of capital by speculators and financial institutions.  
What are the potentials and limits of Marx’s theoretical insights on the timescapes of 
capital circulation? His focus on the contradictions in time of fixed capital and the problem of 
the physical renewal of circulatory networks in capitalism is significant. It allows us to 
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understand why issues around the provisioning of, and repair of these, have recurred in 
historically emergent forms since the mid-nineteenth century. But what Marx did not 
anticipate is how productive these contradictions have been for the creation of arenas of 
market and state action. In fact his exploration of the boom and bust of the railways in 1844-7 
is part of a historical moment in which this process began. Such scandals were widely 
understood as showing the necessity for greater legal and government intervention in the 
market. Indeed Marx developed his own critique into the ethical vision of rational socialist 
state planning. Marx had identified productive contradictions in time. Renewed projects of 
accumulation and legitimacy emerge from the ruins of older vast circulatory networks.  
All of my theoretical interventions come together in a discussion of timescapes of 
capital circulation and speculations on large scale circulatory networks--specifically railways. 
Such vast projects will have a different dynamic of provisioning fixed capital from for 
example, decentralised networks of roads, a single factory or port. In particular railways, as 
Mitchell has pointed out in relation to the US, demand central coordination and capture of 
future income (Mitchell, 2014; Abourahme & Jabary-Salamanca, 2016). Mitchell argues that 
such projects were the foundation for durable forms of corporate power and capitalization in 
the US. But even more significantly plans for railways and similar vast networks generate 
key contractual nodes between the market and the state revealing the hidden “political 
activities of formulas” (Shafiee, 2012).  Such financial agreements are not just another 
economising or marketising device that generates commodities and pricing. They create the 
potentials for, and arenas for contestation of, the legitimacy of state, market and financial 
practices (similar to the nodal contracts associated with state debt, Bear 2016). To deploy 
Marx, Foucault or Callon’s approaches alone would only provide a partial understanding of 
these political-economic treaties for accumulation. Importantly too, analysing such treaties 
helps us to track the structuring of capitalism without positing deep logics or a determining 
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force (Bear et al 2015). Instead we can trace the nodal agreements that create potential for 
speculative action and suture together directional flows of capital and power over long 
periods of time. We will be able to track this dynamic in the history of the Indian railways.  
Before entering this history, I would like to re-emphasise the theoretical significance 
of its coloniality and post-coloniality. By telling the story of capitalism and railways from 
India, it is possible to reveal a significant fact underplayed in the theories of Marx, Foucault 
and Callon. This is that economization and financial instruments have at their centre 
evaluations of race, nation and the social. This is why Marx, for example, failed to predict the 
effects of the Indian railways claiming that they would result in a caste-less, economically 
driven and class-based society leading to revolution (Bear, 2007). It is only by using a 
broadened theoretical concept of speculation rather than economisation or economic value 
that we can capture the reality of capitalism. Now we can enter the Indian history of financial 
formulae for the railways with new theoretical eyes. As we will see particular extractive 
formula were created because India was figured as an unpredictable frontier for capital  
(Tsing 2003). We will then trace two other key moments in the historical emergence of 
treaties for accumulation on the Indian railways. Each of these moments created the potential 
for speculations on global infrastructure in the present.  
The Indian Railway Guarantee: Colonial Public Works and Speculations on Race 1840-
1850 
When plans for the Indian railways began in the 1840s the railway lobby and East India 
Company officials stood on opposed sides in their application of economic theories to India. 
It would have been impossible to predict that the outcome of their speculations would be a 
financial formula that directly tied together their legitimation. Yet as we will see the problem 
of fixing capital in large-scale, long-term circulatory networks drew these classes together in 
the formation of a racialised capitalism.   
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The railway lobby was an alliance of Midland manufacturers, the banking sector and 
engineer entrepreneurs. This group were inspired by the political economy of the journalist 
James McCulloch. Influenced by Ricardo, McCulloch had long campaigned against all forms 
of monopoly and direct government regulation of economic affairs.1 In the context of India 
McCulloch argued for free trade and an end of East India Company monopolies. The railway 
lobby initially proposed private railways to enable an extension of commercial liberty.  
On the other side were government officials in the East India Office and the Board of 
Trade. For them India was a place where tight government regulation was necessary. They 
were influenced by James Mill and John Stuart Mill’s economic theories as well as debates 
about the government regulation of the UK Railway Mania. James Mill in his position first as 
assistant examiner of the India correspondence and later as head examiner provided the 
orthodoxy on how to produce a thriving economy in India. A strong government was the key 
to moral and material progress. Security of person and property needed to be provided by a 
fair, incorruptible bureaucratic and legal system. The taxes raised by the government should 
be limited within the range of a ‘scientific tax.’ Following Ricardo this tax was just the 
proportion of wealth in society that was due to the ‘natural’ differences in the agricultural 
fertility of the soil. This would be spent by the government on public works to increase the 
material and moral progress of the population. In India—a frontier for capital—with different 
social mores the effects of centuries of misrule and irrational taxation had to be overcome. 
Similarly the use of income for religious and other non-productive activities had to be 
gradually eroded. This pattern of spending created a particular problem in India. There was 
no capitalist class who could act as productive investors. Zemindars and peasants were 
squanderers of resources who spent lavishly on marriages and religious rituals. John Stuart 
Mill continued his father’s approach working in the office of the Examiner of the India 
correspondence from 1822 to 1858. Speculations on the social qualities of the Indian 
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economy legitimised East India Company officials. They had to bring a market economy into 
being by judicious government action.   
How then were these opposed interests and visions brought into alignment? Railway 
investors and government officials combined their efforts as a result of the speculative 
spectacle created by the engineer entrepreneur, Rowland MacDonald Stephenson (Thorner, 
1950). He had trained as a civil engineer and was a secretary in a steam ship company that 
had campaigned for the right to transport passengers and goods to India. When this company 
was unsuccessful Stephenson shifted his focus to railways. Initially in 1840 his vision was a 
global scheme. He planned to, “girdle the world with an iron chain, to connect Europe and 
Asia from their furthest extremities by one colossal railway” that would stretch as a “National 
Highway” through France, Germany, Austria, Turkey, Persia and ‘Baloochistan’ into India 
and China.2 Stephenson reluctantly, gave up this plan after touring Europe in 1850 due to 
political obstacles. However his smaller-scale plan for Indian railways was motivated by the 
same enthusiasms. When he first proposed it to the London offices of the East India 
Company in 1841 they were sceptical. So in 1843 he went to Calcutta to persuade the 
officials of the Government of India directly. This was the beginning of a campaign, which 
ended in 1849 with the granting of permission to the East Indian Railway and Great Indian 
Peninsula Railway to build in India backed by a state guarantee of income.  
To explore how Stephenson achieved this alliance we can turn to a document that was 
crucial to his success. In 1844 he published a pamphlet Report upon the Practicability and 
Advantages of the Introduction of Railways into British India. This precipitated a change of 
opinion in the Court of Directors. It also caused a sensation among potential investors 
producing a truth event. This was generated by evoking an uncertainty of value and then 
resolving this through a combination of valuation and evaluation. Stephenson begins the 
pamphlet by acknowledging the doubts of investors who are unsure they can secure a return 
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from enterprises in India because of its peculiar social mores. The remainder of the text 
resolves this uncertainty by invoking the profitability of colonial rule and the certainty of 
returns through racial hierarchies. Stephenson reassures his audience that the profits from the 
proposed Calcutta to Mirzapore line would exceed the 11% return on capital invested in the 
Birmingham to London railway. This was due to, “the level country throughout India, from 
the absence of any heavy Parliamentary expenses, from the cheapness of labour and 
materials, and from the moderate cost of the land, if purchased by the Government of Bengal 
for the Company as being applied to a public work.”3 One of the main expenses for railways 
in Britain were the legal suits with and compensation paid to landowners (Kostal, 1997). 
Stephenson suggested this would not be a problem in India where the government could 
forcibly seize land. Similarly the lobbying of MP’s for support for railway company schemes 
would not be necessary in autocratically governed India. The poverty of the population 
offered the advantage of low wages. He claimed that these ‘advantages’ would reduce the 
expenditure to £8000 per mile rather than the average £36910 a mile spent in Britain on 
constructing railways. Stephenson clinches his argument with an ethical evaluation. He 
insists that to ‘safeguard’ the interests of British shareholders the railway must at all times be 
managed from London and supervised by Europeans. When Stephenson sent his pamphlet to 
the Board of Control at the end of 1844 he put a request at the end of it. This was for a legal 
contract between the government and the shareholders of railway companies that they would 
have a guarantee of a 4% dividend from the Indian taxpayer on the capital invested. This 
formula condensed the valuation and evaluation at work in Stephenson’s pamphlet. It 
guaranteed capital accumulation for railway companies and their shareholders, while also 
legitimising the East India Company’s racial command over their Indian subjects.  
From 1844-1849 arguments over the form of the guarantee continued, but eventually 
the solution was close to that proposed by Stephenson. The railway companies would receive 
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a guaranteed rate of 5 % interest on the capital they deposited with the government for the 99 
years of their contracts. Companies could decide to end their contracts if the railway did not 
prove profitable and the shareholders would receive back all their capital from the 
Government of India. To give the government some control they could reconsider their 
agreements with companies after 20 years of operation. If the government paid treasury 
revenues to cover the guarantee this was treated as a debt relation to the railway company to 
be repaid in surplus years. Any surplus would go half to the company and half to the EIC. 
Shareholders in the railway companies could legally convert their investment in the 
companies into tradable debenture shares in the London Stock Exchange. To support the 
companies the Government used its powers to seize land for the railway companies. Through 
the railway guarantee capitalist enterprise, colonial governance and financial markets were 
drawn into a nodal relation. The Indian railways were run through evaluations of class, 
gender and race (Bear, 2007). Importantly the railway guarantee didn’t perform or create an 
economised sphere of action or world. It converted socio-political inequalities and 
evaluations of racial capacity into secure capital flows and financial trading.  The first ten 
companies formed consolidated into the East Indian Railway, Great Indian Peninsula 
Railway, Eastern Bengal Railway, Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway, Sind Punjab 
and Delhi, Madras, South Indian and Oudh and Rohilkhand Railways which all had 90% of 
their shareholders and their boards of directors located in the UK.  
Indian Railway Debts: Colonial Public Works and Speculations on Economic 
Nationalism 1920-1949 
The railway guarantee resolved the problem of fixing capital long term in the 
‘frontier’ of India. However it did not ensure the railways’ profitability or resolve the 
recurrent problem of renewing circulatory networks. For the first twenty years most of the 
railways made a loss. By 1869 the Indian taxpayer had subsidised the profits of British 
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shareholders to the sum of 30 million pounds (Hurd 1983). From 1870-09 the Government of 
India briefly tried to counteract this draw on its revenues by constructing small branch lines 
directly. But they quickly reverted to new lines built and operated privately with a slightly 
lower guarantee of profits of 4%. From 1870-90s when the original company contracts came 
for a second round of renewal the Government tried to rebalance relations again, but this did 
not end subsidies from Indian subjects’ taxes. For example in 1879 the Government 
purchased four-fifths of the shares of the East India Railway Company with a reformed board 
of directors holding the rest under a 25 year contract with any profits shared in the same 
fractions (Bogart & Chaudhary, 2011). British shareholders and financial markets still 
benefitted from the new arrangements. The price paid for the shares purchased by the 
Government of India was calculated at the average financial market value of the railway 
company’s stock in the preceding three years with payments made as 4-5% annuities to the 
stockholders. Each year until the 1960s Indian government tax revenue was paid to holders of 
East India Peninsula Railway, Great India Peninsula Railway, Eastern Bengal Railway, East 
Indian Railway, South Indian Railway, Scinde, Punjab and Delhi Railway Company shares 
(Bank of England). This produced more than a century of accumulation in the UK from the 
original contracts of the 1840s. Crucially the post 1879 financial arrangements did not solve 
the problem of fixing capital for the renewal or expansion of railways either. Companies 
could request capital for this purpose but this was rarely granted as it added to Government of 
India debt. Chronic under-investment intensified during the First World War due to the heavy 
demands on government expenditure.  
Given these burdens on the taxpayer and the failures of investment, economic 
nationalism from the 1870s was catalysed by challenges to the legitimacy of colonial railway 
finance. These made the current regime of value uncertain and speculated on an alternative 
ethical and calculative order. This evoked the potential of a collective Indian national body 
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politic served by native capital and an independent government. From this critique emerged a 
practice of railway financing that used flows of capital to realise political debts owed by a 
national government to its citizens. This economic nationalism began with the truth event of 
Dadabhai Naoroji’s “Poverty of India” composed in 1873. As a young man Naoroji worked 
as a professor of mathematics at Elphinstone College in Bombay and then joined University 
College London as a lecturer in Gujarati from 1856-65. He also worked at the first Indian led 
trading company in Europe, Cama and Co, leaving this to create his own cotton supply firm 
in 1862. In “The Poverty of India” Naoroji shocked by the devastating Indian famine of 1873 
used accounting to make uncertain the regimes of value associated with British rule. He 
precisely quantified the exact drain of wealth that led to a vampiric theft of the wealth of 
India. The railways were crucial in his argument, especially as they were often described as a 
benevolent gift to India. Naoroji showed that the investment of English capital in India for 
railways caused drains on its resources to the sum of £66,000,000 per year.4 Naoroji 
demanded instead the employment of native agency and capital in the Indian railways. In the 
1880s Naoroji’s arguments generated a full-fledged alternative speculation on the potential 
future of a national economy. They were adopted by the Indian National Congress and Naroji 
served as its president during this period.  
This economic nationalism grew in force through the 1890s to 1920s. For example 
Romesh Chandra Dutt’s The Economic History of India, published in 1903 even challenged 
the material form of the railways as a realisation of the illegitimacy of British rule. Dutt was 
one of the first two Indians appointed to the Indian Civil Service and leader of the Indian 
National Congress in 1899. He used his experience of dealing with famines and cyclones to 
write a PhD thesis at UCL that turned into his 1903 book. In this Dutt argued that railways 
were built in India rather than cheaper and less environmentally damaging canals because 
colonial governance was driven by a public in Britain. Dutt calculated the exact monetary 
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loss to the Indian taxpayer that this represented.5  Dutt’s discussion of the drain of wealth was 
used by nationalist politicians such as Gokhale to challenge railway policy during the Annual 
Railway Budgets. By 1917 these arguments became central to the imagination of an 
interventionist national government that would overcome colonial exploitation and the 
inequalities of Indian society using new kinds of economic theory. Ranade was the most 
influential advocate of this approach. Ranade was a judge under the Deccan Agriculturists’ 
relief act from 1887 and as a result he argued that India was an agricultural colony held back 
by British rule and traditional practices. 6 His approach was given an institutional home when 
Gokhale founded the Ranade Institute of Economics in 1908. The Indian Industrial 
commission of 1916-18 fully realised these arguments in policies that were realised in the 
post-1947 planned economy.7 Railways should be reoriented to a political project of serving 
the Indian public and developing an independent economy. Reversing the racialized 
evaluations of British rule the report argued that through such measures and by following the 
example of Japan, ‘Asiatic races’ too would be able to achieve progress. 
These nationalist speculations coupled with the recurrent contradictions in the funding 
of renewal and construction produced a crisis among colonial officials. In response in 1921 
the Lieutenant-Governor Harcourt Butler convened the Acworth Committee. This aimed to 
create greater popular consent to colonial rule through reforms to railway finance and control. 
The commission was led by the conservative politician and barrister turned railway 
economist Sir William Acworth, who lectured at LSE from the 1890s. He had advised the 
German, Rhodesian and Canadian governments on railway finances. Based on his admiration 
for the US railways his usual remedy was private railway companies. Yet in India, he pushed 
the committee to a different solution suited to the evaluations of the social and racial 
character of the Indian economy (Acworth Report, 1921). Here railways could not be handed 
over to Indian private companies and banks. Indians were not yet ‘ready’ to invest large 
16 
 
amounts of capital because of their habits of squandering resources on consumption. Nor 
could foreign capital be used to finance Indian owned firms as investors in the UK would 
consider it too risky to place their funds in them. The committee conjured again the 
uncertainties of value on the frontier of capital that Stephenson had seventy years before. 
These evaluations were condensed into a new managerial and financial agreement for the 
railways. The government would take all railways under its authority in order to administer 
the repayment of debt to international investors. But it would not intervene in the commercial 
running of the railways, which should be left to corporate principles of profit and loss.  
Following the recommendations of the Acworth Committee up to independence in 
1947 the Indian Railways were gradually taken under government control as pre-existing 
contracts expired (with compensation again paid to shareholders). A new railway department 
was set up with a separate budget from the rest of the government so that railways could be 
run according to commercial principles. The railways were then tied to the government 
through financial debt. The state would borrow capital at current market rates of interest from 
European banks and pass this on as needed. The railway companies would pay back the 
interest on these loans annually. This arrangement was realised in the minutiae of the railway 
accounting structures. These accounts consisted of three elements: a capital at charge 
account, which listed debts to the government; a block account that listed their assets and a 
separate depreciation reserve fund (DRF), which would have added to it annually 1/60th of 
the value of capital at charge. The DRF would be used to fund asset replacement at the level 
of their original cost. Any further cost due to inflation would be covered by further 
government loans and placed as a debt in the capital-at-charge accounts of each railway. 
Given the inevitable decay of circulatory networks and of inflation debt to the government for 
asset replacement would inevitably grow. Once again the problem of fixing capital in 
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railways had not been resolved. Instead it had become a productive basis for a new kind of 
commercial debt like relation within state-railway accounts.  
The contradictions of these commercial debt like relations between the Indian 
railways and the state stopped at Independence. Monetary debts began to be treated as 
political gifts to the future of the nation. Following the arguments of economic nationalism 
under Nehru the railways were given an explicit social purpose. They would be used to 
overcome the disadvantages of the social conditions of India. They would provide state 
employment, low fares for mass travel and tariffs to stimulate exports and develop internal 
markets. Reflecting this, alterations were made to the debt structure of their accounts. 
Railways continued to pay an annual dividend to the government based on the amount held in 
their capital at charge account at a rate slightly higher than the average borrowing rate of the 
government. But importantly any funds spent on improvements were no longer listed as part 
of this debt (Sririman, 2000). Such renewal of circulatory networks was paid for from the 
DRF. The DRF was replenished annually from railway revenues according the amount 
needed to renew the network in the following year. The post-independence financial formulae 
gave the railways gifts of fixed capital which would never need to be repaid. In return the 
government received from the railways an annual political tribute for redistribution. These 
activities were separate from those of international finance. The government would use 
monetization (or creation of money by the central bank) and limited amounts of market 
borrowings from Indian banks. This is a triumphant reversal of the original colonial guarantee 
and the Acworth Committee reforms, which deployed political relations (of taxation and 
colonial rule) to secure accumulation by European companies, banks and financial markets. 
The post-independence accounting used flows of capital and credit to create national political 
relations over the long term.  
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Railways as a Global Asset Class: Infrastructure and Post-Colonial Speculations on 
Global Finance 1980-2018 
For three decades the Indian railways were public works funded by national political 
debt relations. What new speculations on the Indian economy altered this arrangement? 
These began in the mid-1980s as a class of WB and IMF technocrats joined the highest levels 
of the Indian government (Bear, 2016; Ghosh 2006). During this period Indira and then 
Sanjay Gandhi relied more on WB and IMF loans and the expertise of former IFI employees. 
From 1968-1981 an entrenched understanding of India as held back by Hindu fatalism and a 
socialist state permeated the World Bank as Robert MacNamara drew on the economic 
theories of Raj Krishnan and Kakkadan Nandanath Raj to argue that India had a low Hindu 
Rate of Growth (Gould, 2010). Ironically these theories of India’s difference began as a 
justification of the role of technical elites and socialist planning (Shiviah, 1993). However 
under MacNamara WB officials repurposed this into critiques of India’s socialism and 
national ‘difference.’ From 1986-1995 under both the Republican politician Barber B. 
Conable and the ex J.P Morgan Banker Lewis T Preston these accounts of the backwardness 
of India were combined with policies of structural adjustment and reduction of state 
economic control. In these speculations the state and its holding of public debt were 
represented as a corrupt political starving of the forces of market enterprise. Influential ex-
WB and IMF technocrats such as Rakesh Mohan (economic advisor to the department of 
industry 1988-96) and Manmohan Singh (Chief Economic Advisor 1972–76, Reserve Bank 
governor 1982–85,  Planning Commission head 1985–87, Finance Minister 1991-6) and 
Montek Singh Aluwalia (Ministry of Finance 1979-1998, 1998 Member Planning 
Commission) introduced these speculations into public sector strategy. 8 They applied a new 
fiscal discipline to the post-independence regime of political debts pressing down on the 
public services to pay down WB and IMF loans early. This turn was consolidated during the 
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liberalisation reforms of 1991, which led to the control of all top level ministry posts by IMF 
and WB trained economists. Elite technocrats returned to the legitimising mission of colonial 
officials. They should overcome the opaque differences of India or its ‘Hindu Rate of 
Growth’ through government intervention to stimulate markets and private enterprise. 
On the Indian railways this post-coloniality went beyond a similarity in justifications for elite 
governance. Officials directly revived colonial techniques. The Acworth committee 
accounting structure was reactivated to discipline through debt. From the mid-1980s the 
contributions made by the Indian government to the DRF fund of each national railway for 
repair and renewal counted again as part of their debt to the government. Once again the 
Indian bureaucracy was modelling its practices on commercial forms of debt. Importantly this 
move also revived the problem of replenishing the railways. As time passed and the railways 
needed to be renewed or expanded debts to the government would automatically grow. The 
contradictory rhythms of fixed capital would lead to an unresolvable ever-increasing ‘debt 
crisis’ (Ministry of Railways, 1983; 1993; Planning Commission, 1998).  
 
How then was this debt-crisis dealt with? It first became the foundation for national 
financial accumulation and a growing private financial sector. Technocrats in the Railway 
Convention Committee and Ministry of Railways looked for a ‘solution’ to the ‘debt 
problem.’ In 1987 the Indian Railway Finance Corporation was founded in order to raise 
financial market credit within India for the purchase of new rolling stock for the railways. 
The IRFC took debt bonds for rolling stock, which was then leased to railway lines to provide 
regular non-taxable income for the bond holders. This proved to be a very costly solution for 
the railways, but profitable for bond holders. From the 1990s three quarters of the borrowing 
of the IRFC was taken out in order to pay for already existing leasing charges owed to other 
bond-holders (Sririman, 2002). This had highly problematic effects. Railways suffered from 
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old rolling stock, decaying stations and increasing accidents that drew growing critique from 
politicians, the press and the public. They now had a new purpose though, to support the tax-
free growth of private citizen speculators and banks. Like the Indian Infrastructure and 
Leasing Company set up under the auspices of the government in 1987 for other sectors by 
former development banks the IRFC was designed to deepen financial liquidity tax free. 
 
How then did the Indian railways become re-articulated to networks of international 
financial accumulation and institutions? This was a longer process that began with the global 
truth event of the 1994 WB’s Report on Infrastructure for Development written by the 
president Lewis Preston and WB economists who had worked on urban development and 
privatisation especially in Latin America (Antonio Estache, Christine Kessides, Gregory K. 
Ingram, Ashok Mundy, Michael Bruno, Peter Lanjouw and Lant Pritchett). This provided a 
solution for the dilemma that had emerged from WB public debt policies—a world-wide 
degradation of public works. This report made the value of public works uncertain and 
generated speculation on a new global form named infrastructure provisioned by markets and 
international finance. Public works were defined as a private good consumed by populations 
exactly like any other commodity. The state should therefore no longer provide them. Private 
sector and informal forms of provisioning will always be more flexible, efficient and 
contribute to growth. Diverse ‘case studies’ about quite distinct kinds of networks with 
different histories were all made to point to an essential global commodity form. For example 
treated together as infrastructure were: the Indian railway guarantee from the 1840s; the 
privatisation of ports in Malaysia; water provisioning in Cote D’Ivoire; and of telecoms in 
Mexico in the 1990s (World Bank, 1994). Infrastructures would be judged by the extent to 
which they served ‘consumers’ and enabled growth through globalisation and outsourcing. 
What then was post-colonial about this speculation on the potentials of infrastructure? The 
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report sounded a note of caution about the frontiers of capital. It argued that barriers to 
international investment lie in the specific social conditions of various countries. 
Nevertheless these risks can be overcome through special agreements for investors in just the 
same way as they were in the nineteenth century government guarantee for shareholders in 
the Indian railways. The colonial extraction of the railway guarantee was represented as best 
practice.  
The 1994 report had an immediate effect on the new liberalisation regime in India. 
The Congress Party government of India under P.V. Narsimhan Rao with Manmohan Singh 
as finance minister created an expert group on infrastructure in 1994 led by Rakesh Mohan. 
The Indian government for the first time named all its public works as infrastructure and 
joined their fortunes to international investment. In a reversal of the hard-fought battles of 
economic nationalism it proposed a return to guarantee-like contracts for international 
investors. Given the considerable risks to investors, the government should use its resources 
to ‘crowd in’ private investment by taking equity shares in private projects or by guarantees 
to shareholders (Government of India 1997). This aim was realised in the Infrastructure 
Development Finance Company (IDFC) which was set up in 1997. To overcome the riskiness 
of India the government of India and the Indian Reserve Bank held 40% of the equity and 
60% was held by the World Bank, Indian financial institutions and foreign investors. This 
provided a combination of direct lending, purchase of loans and co-financing, take-out 
financing, refinancing, partial credit guarantees and securitization of infrastructure loans.  
Mohan was later vice chairman of this institution for a crucial period from 2000-1. The 
problem of fixing capital would now be resolved again through state guarantees to 
international investors to overcome the frontier of capital in India.  To support this public 
debt repayment would continue so that the Indian government would appear a responsible 
financial agent to investors (Ahluwalia, Montek Singh, 1997).9  
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The move to turn public works into infrastructure continued under both Congress and 
BJP governments. The BJP rejected the Hindu rate of growth speculating instead that the 
Hindu majority could create abundance if liberated from the control of a corrupt, secular, 
socialist state. But the BJP drew on the same elite ex WB economic expertise as Congress, 
applied debt discipline and argued that the railways should be commercially oriented and 
transparent to private investors. During his tenure in 2000 the BJP prime minister Atal Behari 
Vajpayee asked Rakesh Mohan to convene a committee on the railways. Mohan assembled 
experts such as the chairman of Tata R. Gopalakrishnan, the head of McKinsey Kito De Boer 
and the Railway Finance Commissioner P. Ragagopalan. Mohan drew on his WB research on 
private infrastructure in Bogota and application of structural adjustment policies in the 
Philippines to use the accruing debts of the railways to argue for an end to their social 
purpose. They should focus on high speed logistics and transparency for investors. A 
highspeed rail network should be built in the Delhi-Kolkata-Chennai-Mumbai-Delhi Golden 
Quadrilateral. A change to commercial accounting in the railways according to net present 
value would enable financial transparency for shareholders and managerial targets. 
Workforces should be reduced by 20% (Expert Group on Indian Railways, 2001). These 
suggestions met strong resistance from politicians, railway bureaucrats and unions. The 
Indian Railwaymen’s Federation threatened to go on an immediate and indefinite strike if the 
reforms were implemented. The railway bureaucracy feared the repercussions if the new 
accounting structures were implemented. Employees in the railways at all levels were still 
driven by a strong ethic of national, social purpose (Bear, 2007). Nevertheless, even though 
these reforms were not implemented, railway debt continued to automatically increase. The 
people who most paid for this were railway employees, whose numbers were reduced by 
330,000 between 1991 and 2011. The degradation of the railways continued too with a 
chronic lack of investment.  
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At global nodes the WB continued its discourse on infrastructure particularly focussed 
on India. In 2000 a Public-Private Partnership Infrastructure Advisory Facility was set up, 
which had as one of its first reports an account of Indian ‘opportunities.’ In 2006 this 
subdivision published a report on the challenges facing private investment in Indian 
infrastructure. The frontiers of capital could be made more attractive by: a massive expansion 
in the corporate bond and derivatives market; the ending of government red tape; and the 
implementation of regulatory regimes that favoured investors (Finance and Private Sector 
Development Unit, 2006). In fact the WB push focussed on advising governments in how to 
create risk-mitigating structures for international investors setting up an International 
infrastructure Advisory Facility in Singapore (Farquhasan, et al, 2010). India was in the 
spotlight in these projects. By 2010-11 India had become the largest receiver of private 
investment in infrastructure in the developing world receiving 43% of the total private 
investment in developing countries (Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Authority, 2011). 
To aid this investment the Indian administration created a uniform definition of 
‘infrastructure’ across all government departments. The institutions that mediated finance 
movements were the Infrastructure Development Finance Company, the IF&LC and further 
government guaranteed vehicle set up in 2006 The India Infrastructure Finance Company 
Limited. So lucrative was this trade that the IDFC and IIFC joined with the global private 
equity company Blackstone in 2007 to attract USD 5 billion to Indian projects. The Indian 
government under Manmohan Singh set up a further fund of funds backed by government 
guarantees, the Infradebt fund in 2013 (Government of India, 2010). It received AAA ratings 
from Moody’s and other agencies because of its Ministry of Finance backing. Between 2013-
17 it raised 800 million dollars in rupee denominated bonds. The government support for 
such funds was still not always seen as sufficient to overcome the risky frontiers of capital in 
India. As an influential City of London report on Indian infrastructure put it in 2012, 
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particular barriers still exist: uncertainty in the regulatory environment, failures to enact 
economic and financial reforms and taxation of indirect investments. Such reports are, like 
Stephenson’s from the 1840s and that of Acworth in the 1920s, an attempt to draw the state 
into an alliance with international financiers on the basis of the peculiar qualities of India. 
Mentioned as positive developments were: a viability gap funding scheme that provided 
government funds to back risky PPPs and the formation of infrastructure debt funds with 
more favourable tax terms. Further changes were called for that included making it easier to 
acquire land, to get environmental clearances and creating a stream of ‘bankable’ projects. 
There is now no economic nationalist accounting of the flows of income captured or 
extracted within or outside India from building roads, airports, housing and ports. Nor any 
sense that infrastructure were once public works with a social purpose. Instead the WB and 
international financiers have joined with Indian governments to press for greater 
financialization of Indian circulatory networks. These exist for the twin goals of logistics and 
for circulation and accumulation in national and international financial markets.  
Given this ‘success’ it is not surprising that attention has turned again to the railways. 
In 2013 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh asked Rakesh Mohan to convene a National 
Committee on the Development of Transport Infrastructure. This renewed the vision for the 
railways of 2001 on a grander scale calling for a complete reorientation of the railways 
towards commercial logistics. Six dedicated freight corridors should take the straightest route 
possible even through protected tribal lands reviving the colonial autocratic public authority 
over land. There also should be a more radical privatisation than ever before in the railway’s 
history. Suburban lines should be hived off and run by local state governments in PPPs. State 
run railway workshops should be privatised. Stations and land should be sold off to private 
owners. Funding should come from government backed financial vehicles and banking 
intermediaries that allowed international investors to have confidence in the risky frontier of 
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India.  Suresh Prabu’s recent policies for Indian railways in the Bibek Debroy Report (2015) 
and 2016 railway budget replay these speculations on the railways. This is not surprising 
given his earlier service in the BJP government from 1998-2004 when as Union Minister for 
Power he introduced privatisation into the electricity sector. What is new is a more specific 
account of the guarantees to be offered to international investors as demanded by the WB and 
investors, made much easier by the lifting of restrictions on foreign direct investment through 
PPP in August 2014 (notification N.S.O, 2113). In 2016 to ensure the consent of the powerful 
and previously resistant railway bureaucracy and unions to reforms Suresh Prabhu brought 
the railways under the central control of the finance ministry and government fiscal 
responsibility acts. Piyush Goyal who replaced Prabu in September 2017 is pressing forward 
with this vision. Subsidies to special classes of passengers and to the transport of essential 
foods and suburban lines are now described as ‘social burdens’ that impinge on railways’ 
viability (2016, Niti Ayog). Railways now print the subsidy provided on each railway ticket 
issued to the public to make them aware of a financial ‘crisis.’ PPPs have expanded into the 
direct operation and construction of railway infrastructure. Most recently with General 
Electric, Bombadier and Alstrom winning contracts for the construction of engines, 
electrification and other vital elements of the new freight corridors (Swaminathan, 2017). 
The direct post-coloniality of this project of infrastructure is visible in the conversion 
of railway debt into forms of international financial accumulation. The debt in the IRFC was 
born from the change back to colonial Acworth Committee accounting structures in the 
railways. This debt has now been financialised in two ways. The IRFC has been incorporated 
into the larger National Infrastructure Investment Fund backed by Indian government 
guarantees. Founded in 2015 this is a fund of funds. It is a trust that raises debt on the equity 
of sub-organisations thereby allowing another tier of rentier income (http://niifindia.in/). As a 
trust there is no tax on the income it gives to its investors. Returns to investors are guaranteed 
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by the presence of 49% of Indian government money in each investment product up to a level 
of 20000 crore per annum. The fund has also taken on quasi planning roles as it vets projects 
for investment and prepares a pipeline of future projects with commercial viability. It now 
has investments of over $800 million and issues international bonds on the London Stock 
Exchange. The first investors in this fund have also included other quasi market-state forms. 
They include RUSNANO, a Russian company (whose CEO is appointed by the president), 
Dubai Ports (which is backed by the Dubai government’s sovereign wealth fund) and Abu 
Dhabi sovereign wealth fund (Ministry of Finance Press Information Bureau, 2018). 
Secondly the debt in the IRFC has also now been directly connected to international stock 
markets. In December 2017 it issued its first green bond on the London Stock Exchange 
(London Stock Exchange, 2017). This would run for ten years at a fixed rate of return of 3.85 
percent and would be invested in the creation of dedicated freight corridors and passenger 
transport. The bond was three times oversubscribed and received an investment of $500 
million. And the capital does not of course go directly to the railways, but sustains other 
rentier structures--of the IRFC bondholders, who are also under the rentier structure of the 
NIIF. In 2019 this was followed up by a standard overseas bond offer of $500 million at a 
yield of 2.23% on the London Stock Exchange. Here we have the emergent nodal contracts 
between the market and the state. The state guarantees international financial markets rentier 
returns on capital and reforms its laws so as to give as favourable an institutional and tax 
environment for financial capital as possible. This has generated an effervescence of 
speculation with reports being issued by Black Rock, Morgan Stanley, Accenture, Arcadis 
and McKinsey in 2015-17.  
Even without the direct privatisation of the Indian railways, they are now a global 
financial asset class. Accumulation is invisible in the records of national and international 
capital flows and is sheltered by the confidential shells of private contract law. Foreign 
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governments and investors are once again accumulating from India’s railways, but these have 
now become infrastructure. They exist for logistical efficiency and for the growth of national 
and international financial institutions. This trend for government guarantees or the 
socialisation of private risk and guarantee of private profits across all sectors is only 
intensifying. This is driven by the recent near collapse of the only relatively government 
independent infrastructure investment vehicle the IIF&LC in October 2018. This threatened a 
Lehmann style banking crisis, which was resolved by taking IIF&LC under the Reserve Bank 
of India to guarantee its continuing profitable operation.  
Conclusion: For New Speculations 
The longue durée of the Indian railways raises crucial questions for our most widely used 
theories of capitalism. Work in the vein of Marx, Foucault or Callon cannot fully capture this 
history or its significance because it assumes that capitalism—and in particular its contracts 
and calculative devices--operate through a narrowly defined economic valuation of the world. 
Any divergences from this are described as varieties of capitalism or cultural/historical 
additions to a central economising discourse or series of techniques. But if, as they should be, 
apparently ‘anomalous,’ ‘peripheral’ or ‘frontier’ sites such as the Indian railways are taken 
as a central to global capitalism this theoretical view is undermined.  Instead economic 
theories, contracts and calculative devices are show to contain within them wide-ranging 
speculations on racial, social and national potentials. Once this is recognized it is possible to 
trace the connections between forms of global financial accumulation in the past created from 
colonial capitalism and those in the present. In the case of the Indian railways definitions of 
frontiers of capitalism, forms of government guarantee and debt accounting recur in 
historically emergent forms and are directly capitalised on in a post-colonial present. Indian 
technocrats, International Financial Institutions, national banks, global financial markets and 
foreign governments all accumulate capital and power from the long term-history of colonial 
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public works and their reconstitution in the present.  There have, of course, been many 
empires including those of the US in Latin America and post-socialist societies, Japan in 
South-East Asia, the socialist empire of Russia and current formations around Middle Eastern 
sovereign wealth funds and Chinese capital and debt. Importantly each imperial formation 
and its legacies will create distinct representations of difference, redeploy techniques and 
treaties for accumulation in different ways and will generate distinct vectors of accumulation. 
However significantly international financial institutions including the WB, IMF, Asian 
Development Bank and New Development Bank are central mediators of these speculations.  
 
The history of the Indian Railways reveals too just how productive the timescapes of 
circulation are for the generation of nodal treaties for accumulation between the market and 
the state. The problem of fixing capital in the construction and renewal of large-scale 
circulatory networks has been resolved in four distinct ways in three crucial moments in this 
history. First in the 1840s by state guarantees that legitimised colonial rule and accumulation 
in the UK that founded the prosperity of the London stock market. Secondly in the 1920s by 
forms of disciplining by debt to legitimise the role of a colonial government that also ensured 
returns to international banks. Thirdly in the 1940s-mid 1980s by a political accounting that 
aimed to generate a national economy. Fourthly from the mid-1980s to the present a return to 
disciplining by debt and state guarantees to develop private financial accumulation and 
institutions on a national and international scale. At each stage there has been the emergence 
of a long-term structuring of power from the degrading ruins of public works and attempts to 
solve the problem of fixing capital in these. This historical process is entirely hidden within 
the discourse on infrastructure generated by the World Bank, Indian Government and 
Financial Institutions. It is also hidden inside the technical forms used to value infrastructure. 
This shows again why we cannot use a solely Marxist, Foucauldian or Callonesque approach 
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to capitalism. The problem of the dispossession of public works and accumulation from 
infrastructure cannot be captured by attention to a separate form of economic value, discourse 
or calculative device alone. This dispossession and accumulation occurs as a result of wide-
ranging speculation that includes within its techne both evaluation and valuation. This 
produces timescapes of capital circulation and non-human forms that regenerate persistent 
inequalities.  
It is clear as well from this history that infrastructure cannot be treated as a neutral 
theoretical term. Its unity has been constructed by International Financial Institutions, 
government committees, global investors and market consultancies. The marketization of 
public works and their transformation into a global asset class is secured through the legal 
definition of all of a nation’s circulatory networks as infrastructure. In addition the 
similarities between the celebrations of the new visibility of infrastructure in the 1994 World 
Bank Report on Infrastructure and its ubiquity as a theme in the social sciences is striking. 
This report salutes its emergence from being the “gray backdrop of economic life—
underground and out of mind.” (World Bank 1994: 12) and improvised provisioning by the 
poor in ways that are very similar to our sociological and anthropological approaches. If we 
are to continue to use the term infrastructure it should be deployed in a critical genealogical 
engagement. We can use it to reveal the new rentier forms of extraction hidden by private 
contract law and to challenge the ways in which our state institutions legitimate financial 
market action and accumulation. We live in a time when we need again evaluations and 
valuations like those of Indian economic nationalists. We need to track drains of wealth and 
accumulation from infrastructure financing. We also need to rethink public finances as 
political gifts of time and to imagine public-public partnerships. Some counter-moves are 
underway, in particular the Eurodad, Jubilee Debt and European Association of Actuaries 
challenges to the World Bank promotion of infrastructure PPPs. But we need much more 
30 
 
wide-ranging speculations on infrastructure to re-orient our circulatory networks to the public 
good.    
 
All of these insights have arisen by deploying a new critical understanding of 
capitalist action as speculation. To rephrase Callon the economy is not embedded in 
economics--economic theory, heuristics and action are embedded in speculation. As we have 
seen throughout the history of the Indian railways speculation is stimulated by productive 
uncertainty. Exemplary figures such as MacDonald Stephenson, Naoroji, MacNamara, 
Preston and Mohan make visible a vast invisible realm of ethical forces in truth events where 
multiple forms of symbolic meaning are conjoined. As a result of these attention is drawn to 
potentials and possibilities. Different social groups mobilise around these to capture capital 
and power through the creation of treaties for accumulation. Once these are created durable 
forms of extraction are generated. These persist until another productive uncertainty is 
created from contradictions in the timescapes of circuits of capital and non human-human 
relations. Current forms of governance, as we have seen in the account of the transition of the 
Indian railways from public works into infrastructure increasingly demand more speculation 
from citizens. They are part of the creation of a redistribution of capital from the control of 
governance into the hands of private financial institutions that incite all of us to undertake 
forms of speculation in credit, pension protection and insurance. Now it is not an 
exaggeration to say that the commons of circulatory systems built from and supported by tax-
payer revenues exist for financial institutions and that we all incited to become citizen-
speculators. The political relations and capital accumulation built from these social-non-
human relations are more spectacular and present in our lives than ever before. And at the 
same time their contours have never been so hidden and difficult to trace as they are protected 
by private legal regimes, are off the books of national treasuries and involve pension, 
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sovereign wealth and equity funds. It is this play between visibility and invisibility that 
generates intensifying speculation. More hopefully it may lead to increasing scandals and 
demands for political accountability that will question the role of circulatory networks as a 
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